On September 30, the Department of Commerce will introduce the initial version of the Traffic Coordination System for Space (TraCSS), designed to warn space operators of potential collisions. This initiative follows an agreement with the Department of Defense (DoD) to transfer data from military assets that monitor space. The implementation of TraCSS will follow a phased approach, starting with “Phase 1.0,” which includes a small group of beta users and a subset of monitoring data sources. This transition aims to shift the responsibility of space situational awareness for commercial and civil satellite operators from the Pentagon to the Office of Space Commerce (OSC), allowing the military to focus on threats from adversaries.
Key figures, Sandy Magnus from the OSC and Barbara Golf from Space Systems Command, discussed the ongoing efforts to manage data security concerns, particularly regarding the sharing of military radar and telescope data with non-military users. The DoD and Commerce will operate their space tracking systems in parallel until TraCSS can match the military’s capabilities. The public can access rough coordinates of space objects via SpaceTrack.org, although not all military and intelligence satellites are included.
Several cybersecurity concerns arise with the introduction of TraCSS. The transfer of sensitive data from military assets to TraCSS introduces risks related to data interception and unauthorized access, making secure communication channels and encryption methods essential. Determining appropriate access levels for various users, especially non-military ones, poses a challenge, necessitating strict access control measures and continuous monitoring to prevent unauthorized access and misuse of data. Ensuring data integrity during transfer and storage is critical, as any tampering or corruption can lead to incorrect collision warnings and potentially catastrophic outcomes. While the DoD and Commerce systems run in parallel, ensuring synchronization and consistency between the two databases is vital to avoid conflicting information and maintain trust in the system.
Managing the transition of classified data to a system with potentially lower security clearance levels raises concerns about inadvertent exposure of sensitive information, making robust protocols for handling and sanitizing classified data essential. As TraCSS becomes operational, it will likely become a target for cyber attacks aimed at disrupting space situational awareness, necessitating advanced threat detection and response mechanisms. Additionally, sharing space situational awareness data with foreign commercial and civil operators introduces risks related to differing security standards and potential espionage, highlighting the need for international agreements and standards for data security.